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PPPs in China: Does the growth in 




This study provides insight into the nature of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 
China, a country that has invested more in PPPs than any other over the last two 
decades. It is puzzling that China, as a state-led economy, has turned to embrace 
PPPs. Pundits have taken this as evidence of a liberalising Chinese economy. 
However, our findings suggest that PPPs in China do not reflect a break from earlier, 
state-centric modes of governance; rather, the state essentially uses such partnerships 
as a mechanism to strengthen its own hand. We argue that the difference between how 
PPPs are being implemented in China compared to the West reflects differences in 
political economic contexts, both materially and ideologically. In both cases, the 
ambiguity surrounding the PPP model has been used to advance particular interests, 
serving as a reminder of both the ways in which power shapes the character of such 
policy tools and the differences in the relative power underpinning state-market 
relations in each context. By challenging mainstream interpretations of what PPPs are 
and what their proliferation means, studying the political economy of PPPs in a rising 
China further exposes the Western-centric nature of prevailing wisdom in political 










The modern field of political economy has been developed in the West.1 Through 
theoretical and empirical investigation, core concepts have been forged in Western 
workshops. It is little wonder then that the meteoric rise of China and the concomitant 
scholarship on the subject has begun posing a challenge to accepted wisdom in the 
field (Breslin 2012, 2007; Zhang 2013). The emergence of China as an economic 
powerhouse is not only materially significant, but also theoretically, as the scholarship 
accompanying this development has the potential to disrupt the universalising theories 
of state-market relations developed within and focused on liberal-market democracies 
(Chin et al. 2013; Henderson et al. 2013). Such is the case with public-private 
partnerships (PPPs).  
 
China has invested in more PPPs since 2000 than any other country in the world (PPI 
Database 2015). This is puzzling. Why has China, a state-run economy, embraced 
PPPs on such a large scale? And what does this turn to PPPs represent in terms of 
China’s economic liberalisation, and Chinese state-market relations and the future of 
Chinese governance? Leading industry and government bodies have understood the 
Chinese uptake of PPPs to be evidence of a liberalising economy.2 This aligns well 
with existing Western scholarship on China, where many view the Chinese regime as 
a ‘temporary aberration’, with liberalisation around the corner (Ang, 2018). But China 
continues to defy expectations, using the PPP model on its own terms. These analyses 
seem to be based on interpretations of PPPs developed in the West; there has been 
surprisingly little detailed scholarship on PPPs in China to date.  
 
Based on the Western experience, popular and academic opinion of PPPs tend to 
understand these policy instruments in the context of three discourses that have 
remained dominant since the 1990s: conceptual debates surrounding the shift from 
government to governance and the reconstitution of the state, ideological 
considerations relating to the spread of neoliberal values and the rising power of the 
private sector, and pragmatic analyses that see PPPs as a universal policy tool for 
economic development. Building from these discourses, we develop a set of 
indicators to help evaluate the extent to which Chinese uptake of PPPs in 
infrastructure should be taken as a sign of a liberalising economy, one that is moving 




We find that in sharp contrast to prevailing understandings of PPPs in the West, 
Chinese PPPs are being used as a tool to strengthen the state. The Chinese context 
enables state officials to maintain primacy, using the PPP brand to access finances 
rather than sharing mutual benefits. We argue that these outcomes reflect the relative 
power underpinning state-market relations, as well as underlying beliefs about the 
appropriate role of the state in the economy, which are mutually reinforcing. This 
verifies the highly political and protean nature of PPPs in both China and the West. 
 
Our findings are both materially and theoretically significant. Materially, they suggest 
that the uptake of PPPs in China is not a sign of a liberalising China but, rather, a 
mechanism to further consolidate state control over the economy. Theoretically, they 
challenge mainstream interpretations of what PPPs are and what their proliferation 
means, further exposing the Western-centric nature of prevailing wisdom in the field. 
 
A note on methods 
This is a case study investigating the emergence of PPPs as an infrastructure model in 
China. We chose the case for the puzzle it presents and opted for an exploratory 
approach due to the unique characteristics of the political economic context, which 
stands in contrast to the context where the model and our understanding of PPPs 
originated: states with developed liberal market economies. While there has been 
scholarship focused on the rise of PPPs in other emerging economies, China remains 
unique in terms of the strength of the state. 
 
The main empirical evidence is drawn from academic journals across disciplines such 
as public management, project management and project finance, as well as primary 
documents relating to Chinese law, government memorandums, and newspaper 
articles. Reports gathered from intergovernmental organisations (IOs) and global 
consultancies are combined to further support the empirical evidence. We also 
obtained data from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database, which is used to highlight trends in PPP activity.  
 
Building a framework 
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The term ‘PPP’ is hotly contested and used to describe a wide range of relationships. 
While sometimes referring to multi-stakeholder partnerships in health and sustainable 
development (Andonova 2014), it is most often associated with private financing in 
infrastructure. PPPs in infrastructure are a neologism for combining the public sector 
and private sector to deliver public services. The European Commission (2003, p. 
128) define PPPs as ‘the transfer to the private sector of investment projects that 
traditionally have been executed or financed by the public sector.’ According to this 
definition, PPPs could involve anything from full divestiture to a traditional build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contract, the most common form of PPP.3 The conceptual 
fuzziness of existing definitions of the term has already received significant academic 
attention (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2012; Klein 2015; 
Vives 2008). As Zhang et al. (2015, p. 498) have noted, such arrangements are known 
as PFI in the UK, BOT in Asia-Pacific, concession in France and PPI in the World 
Bank, ‘each with possible relevance to the political, economic, legal, cultural and 
industrial backdrops.’ Although the fluidity of the term is key to our findings, a 
functional definition provides an important starting point, for which we turn to the 
IMF: 
 
An arrangement where the private sector supplies assets and services that 
traditionally have been provided by the government. In addition to private 
execution and financing of public investment, PPPs have two others 
important characteristics: there is an emphasis on service provision, as well 
as investment, by the private sector; and significant risk is transferred from 
the government to the private sector (IMF 2004, p. 6). 
 
While public-private arrangements have existed since the beginning of organised 
government, their symbolic value has changed in the context of modern governance 
(Wettenhall 2010). In the 1970s and early 1980s, PPPs were originally championed as 
an instrument to increase governance effectiveness, part of the New Public 
Management (NPM) era, formulated in the United Kingdom (UK) and then spread far 
and wide (Yamamoto 2007). 
 
This ‘new global paradigm’ ushered in the marketisation of the state through 
privatisation, decentralisation of functions, contracting out services, and the 
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promotion of partnerships such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Osborne 2000). 
Initially promoted under the controversial PFI, the origins of the term ‘PPP’ was 
driven by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, who wanted to make it sound ‘friendlier’ 
and play down its conservative origins (Wettenhall 2010). PPPs were not only gaining 
cross-party support in the developed world, but also proved popular in the developing 
world where financially challenged public sectors looked to the private sector to build 
infrastructure and drive economic growth (Esty 2004; Garvin and Bosso 2008). In the 
1990s, multilateral lenders, such as the World Bank and IMF, were forcing through 
reforms in line with NPM doctrines, and so many cash-strapped, emerging economies 
embraced the model to meet their infrastructure needs without their balance sheets 
being affected (Chen 2010). Within thirty years, the popularity of PPPs within 
policymaking circles was unprecedented, with nearly all developing countries either 
flirting with the idea of PPPs, or already ‘wed to it’ (Estache 2006, p. 3).  
 
This rapid proliferation of PPPs in infrastructure across the world has attracted 
scholarly attention from multiple disciplines, including public management, 
construction and project management, public administration, and project finance. 
Much of the focus has been functional, looking at critical success factors and how 
various aspects of infrastructure PPPs could be improved from a public management 
perspective, including in China (Liu et al. 2016 ; Chan et al. 2010). 
 
Most pertinent to this study is the literature exploring the political and intellectual 
underpinnings of the PPP movement. Scholars have interrogated how power has 
influenced varying definitions and meanings of PPPs and how this, in turn, has 
impacted their functions (Linder 1999; Savas 2000; Teisman and Klijn 2002). With 
few exceptions, scholars have developed an understanding of PPPs by studying their 
implementation in liberal market economies. As such, the dominant role of the private 
sector has held the spotlight (Bitzer 2012; Miraftab 2004). 
 
Drawing on the expectations of this rich scholarship, we develop indicators to help us 
evaluate the extent to which the uptake of infrastructure PPPs in China constitutes a 
shift from government to governance, a deeper acceptance of market-driven values, 
and an acceptance of a universal PPP model to delivery efficiencies and value for 




The shift from government to governance 
PPPs are seen as exemplary of the new ‘steering’ role associated with the movement 
from government to governance (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Rosenau 1995). 
Through a governance lens, governments are no longer the sole service providers, but 
are increasingly service regulators (Stoker 1998). For example, HM Treasury (2015, 
p. 12) states that PPPs are expected to ‘evolve the role of government’ away from that 
of primary provider of services, towards a more developmental and regulatory market 
role.  
 
The process of changing the role of the state and increasing private sector 
participation involves a series of reforms in policy formulation, risk allocation and the 
legal and regulatory framework. Some of these are highlighted in the UN Commission 
on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) legislative guide on privately funded 
infrastructure projects, where it suggests a review of national constitutions that 
exclusively reserve provision of public services to the state (UNCITRAL 2001). 
 
Recent international experience has also demonstrated the need for a central unit 
within the national government’s administration with the overall responsibility for 
‘formulating policy and providing practical guidance on privately financed 
infrastructure projects’ (Ibid. P. 29). Many governments have established these 
central, specialised PPP units, which have played a ‘catalytic’ role in promoting and 
developing PPPs (UNESCAP 2014a, p. 1).  
 
With funding from the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has 
developed an index and learning tool to assess the capacities of countries in different 
regions across the world to carry out sustainable PPPs. This covers six different 
elements, but weights the legal and regulatory framework and institutional framework 
higher than others.4 The index is typical of the shift from government to governance, 
with the EIU (2014, p. 4) explicitly stating ‘an important feature of PPPs is the 
transfer of responsibility for service provision while maintaining a significant 
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Undertaking these types of PPP-enabling reforms can be seen as part of a broader 
shift toward a new kind of ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1997). These recommendations, 
highlighted in Figure 1, are followed by a wide range of countries, including the UK, 
Brazil, India, Bangladesh and Australia – and are broadly consistent with those 
offered across the construction management, project finance, and public management 
literatures. As such, we treat these recommendations as indicators to explore whether 
the PPP model in China is part of a similar shift by evaluating how closely the state 
has followed them in terms of both policy formulation as well as formalisation into 
laws and administrative units. 
 
Infiltration of neoliberal values  
Viewed through an ideological lens, PPPs have been interpreted as a neoliberal 
construction invented to increase the power of private actors in global affairs (Börzel 
and Risse 2005; Miraftab 2004; Zammit 2003). Indeed, PPPs find their roots in the 
neoliberal policy notions of privatisation and deregulation of the 1980s, and have 
been linked to the NPM agenda (Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Stoker 
1998). The logic of transferring responsibility to the market is advocated by many 
development agencies that were strongly driven by NPM at the time, alongside the 
concepts of economic adjustment, privatisation, and deregulation (Mitchell-Weaver 
and Manning 1991). According to NPM, governments should outsource functions to 
other actors with more experience and efficiency; with this comes a stronger emphasis 
on market mechanisms and the involvement of private actors (Hood 1995, 1991).  
 
According to Savas (2000), the ambiguity of the term ‘PPP’ has evolved as a new 
language game in public management to cover older, established procedures 
involving private organisations in the delivery of public services. Where terms like 
‘privatisation’ evoke sharp political and ideological reactions, ‘PPP’ avoids this 
‘inflammatory effect’, and invites more ‘people and organisations to join the debate’ 
(Ibid. 2000, p. 1–2). As such, the vagueness of the term serves political objectives and 
obscures underlying ideological meanings. For example, PPP has been used to 
describe contracting-out schemes, private finance contracts and even full divestiture 
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(Hodge and Greve 2007, 2010; Teisman and Klijn 2002). Some fear that the private 
provision of infrastructure effectively represents the privatisation of public services 
(Ng and Loosemore 2007; Srivastava 2010) and the ambiguity of the term has 
facilitated this neoliberal agenda. 
 
Whilst policymakers attempt to emphasize the utilitarian aspect of PPPs, the 
environment required to facilitate and deliver them has never been ideologically 
neutral or open. There appears to be an inherent acceptance of neoliberal values, such 
as increasing free market competition. Indeed, ‘the driving force behind successful 
PPP programmes is competition. If PPPs are introduced without the essential element 
of competition, it is argued, the transformational effects […] are unlikely to be 
realised’ (HM Treasury 2015, p. 13). The market structure, legal framework and 
regulatory bodies must therefore create appropriate conditions for the private sector to 
bid competitively for PPP contracts. Privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
is also well-documented as a strong precursor to encouraging the PPP process, as it 
enhances competition and is often accompanied by regulatory reform (Hamilton 
2009; World Bank 2015).  
 
In order to assess the extent to which the rise of PPPs in China signal a commitment 
to the core tenets NPM and a furthering of the neoliberal agenda we rely on two rough 
indicators: the level of outsourcing public services to the private sector and the 
maturity of competitive tendering.  
 
Universal policy solution 
PPPs have been hailed as a universal policy solution to tackle global problems, 
especially a lack of infrastructure. Organisations such as the OECD, the World Bank 
and the IMF are committed to a view of global convergence based on a single ‘best 
practice’ model, which they see as their institutional role to foster, helping the 
‘laggards’ to catch up with the ‘vanguard’ (Hood 1995, p. 108). In a pragmatic sense, 
PPPs are put forward as an innovative best practice solution. 
 
Donor agencies have been involved in the design and implementation of regulatory 
reforms toward this end, which, according to some estimates, for over a quarter of 
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their total development assistance (Parker and Figueira 2010). Considering the rapid 
scale-up of PPPs to be of ‘high strategic relevance’, the World Bank in particular has 
expanded its support through a wide range of instruments and services (World Bank 
2015, p. vii). For example, from 2002 to 2012, its financial support for PPPs tripled, 
rising from $0.9 billion to $2.9 billion (Ibid.). The shift in World Bank policy 
followed the publication of the World Development Report (WDR) (1994), which 
promoted the expansion of PPPs and institutional reform in order to ensure efficient 
delivery of partnership projects. This report was arguably the first major work 
towards fashioning a space for PPPs as feasible policy options. They are now framed 
as a ‘strategic necessity rather than a policy option’, representing a ‘unique and 
flexible solution to implement infrastructure projects’ (UNECE 2002, p. 3). The latest 
figures suggest PPPs account for 20 per cent of total infrastructure investment in low 
and middle-income countries, which is approximately double the level in the late 
1980s (Klein 2015, p. 5).  
 
The World Bank (2015a) reports that over one billion people live without electricity, 
one billion live at least two kilometres from all-weather roads, 750 million do not 
have access to safe drinking water, and 60 per cent lack access to the internet. The 
infrastructure gap that ‘constrains economic growth’ is now estimated at US $1 
trillion, with an additional $57 trillion in investment needed by 2030 (Mendoza 2016; 
World Bank 2015, 2011). The World Bank explains these gaps by highlighting 
government insufficiency, as they face ‘capacity and financial constraints’ and ‘fall 
short of bridging the infrastructure gap’ (Ibid.).  
 
Multinational consultancies, such as Price Waterhouse Cooper (2010, p. vii), further 
this this line of argument: ‘government budgets are under severe pressure […] more 
now than ever’. Deloitte (2007, p. 1) agrees: governments are ‘turning to the private 
sector’ in order to solve the infrastructure deficit. The private sector is thus framed as 
the expedient solution to a severe and growing problem. ‘Underinvestment in 
infrastructure is one of the most highly interconnected risks, with potential systemic 





PPPs are framed not only as a solution to government fiscal constraints, but they are 
also a means to improve the quality and delivery of public services by tapping into 
private sector expertise. The private sector brings an ‘entrepreneurial, results-driven 
approach to infrastructure’, and whilst a shortage of government funding makes a 
difference, a more serious hurdle is ‘a lack of know-how to develop infrastructure 
projects’ (IFC 2012, p. 4). HM Treasury (2012), United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) (2002) and PPIAF (2014) echo these statements, 
implying that the private sector is more innovative, creates incentives to maximise 
efficiency, and takes full advantage of business opportunities.  
 
In sum, the pragmatic rationale for the rapid scale-up in support for PPPs is based on 
the claim that they have the potential to ‘close the infrastructure gap by leveraging 
scarce public funding and introducing private sector technology and innovation to 
provide better quality public services through improved operational efficiency’ 
(World Bank 2015, p. 5). They have been thus framed as a universal solution for 
governments facing infrastructure gaps, budget limitations, and a lack of expertise. To 
evaluate China’s acceptance of a universal PPP model to tackle their infrastructure 
challenges, we explore the investment needs of the public sector and the extent to 
which the public sector draws on and benefits from the resources and expertise of the 
private sector. 
 
These three debates capture the predominant ways in which PPPs have been defined 
and their broader significance understood. Table 1 summarises the framework.  
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Applying the framework to China 
 
Government to governance 
Conceptually, we are looking for evidence of a move from government to 
governance, and whether the growth of infrastructure PPPs in China has signalled this 
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shift. Whilst this remains a somewhat abstract concept, we use the level of maturity of 
the PPP-enabling environment as a proxy for the transformation, zeroing in on PPP 
policy formulation and formalisation.  
 
Policy formulation 
2014 was hailed as a ‘landmark year’ in Chinese PPP development both in terms of 
specific policy reform and political commitment (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 2015, p. 2). The EIU Infrascope Index (2014) indicated 
China was experiencing the greatest improvement in political will toward this end. 
This change in commitment can be traced back to the third plenum of the 18th Chinese 
Community Party (CCP) Central Committee in November 2013. A policy agenda was 
announced with the aim of reducing central government interference in the economy 
and accelerating the improvement of the modern market system. The plenum stressed 
that the ‘underlying issue is striking a balance between the role of government and 
that of the market’ (CCP 2013). Later in 2014, Chinese government circular talks 
promoted ‘the transition of [government’s] role from direct ‘provider’ of public goods 
to ‘partner’ of private capital and ‘supervisor’ of PPP projects (NDRC 2014).5 This 
policy reform programme launched by the CCP in late 2013 seems to suggest that 
PPPs in China are signalling a conceptual shift in state responsibility.  
 
Furthermore, support for the PPP model has come from the highest levels of 
government, including Premier Li Keqiang and Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei. The 
latter, for example, has proclaimed PPPs as an important reform instrument that can 
leverage the reconstitution of government functions and allow the market to play a 
more important role in urbanisation and resource allocation (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 2014; Jiao 2014). New private investment rules came into 
force in 2015, symbolic of China’s recent efforts to open public services to private 
investors and encourage PPPs (NDRC, 2015). Although it seems investors were 
initially wary about the level of risk, according to global law firm Pinsent Masons 
(2015a), after 1 June 2015, private investors were granted greater financial security 
and better credit support from local banks. It appeared both domestic and foreign 
private sector companies would be able to take advantage of these new investment 
opportunities, as Article 3 of the new law stipulated that the public sector would be 
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allowed to enter into concession contracts with both domestic companies and those 
incorporated outside China (NDRC 2014; Pinsent Masons 2015b). PPP mechanisms 
were also the favoured model in public services, as they fall under both government 
responsibility and market-based operations (NDRC 2014). This converges with the 
wider CCP strategy as outlined above and seems to signal a conceptual shift in the 
role of government.   
 
Policy formalisation  
Whilst the political commitment and initial moves toward policy reform support the 
conceptual framing of PPPs as signalling a shift to regulatory governance, the actual 
formalisation of the PPP process in terms of establishing a clear legal basis and 
administrative units has been lacking.   
 
Except for some ministries’ regulations, such as the Ministry of Commerce, there is 
no national PPP law in China. The regulations issued by the State Council, its 
ministries, and provincial governments often pay attention to their own 
responsibilities rather than focusing on ‘compatibility or completeness’ (Ke and 
Wang 2015, p. 76). PPPs can therefore be implemented differently in different places 
in China; whereas in some provinces state reconstitution may be aided by stronger 
regulations, in others the investors still face great legal and regulatory risks.  
 
The EIU Infrascope Index for Asia-Pacific (2014, 2012) provides a useful point of 
comparison. In 2011, China ranked 7th overall on the Infrascope scale (out of a 
possible 16 in the study).6 It ranked 11th for legal and regulatory framework, and 13th 
for institutional framework. 
 
With the expressed political commitment to move government toward service 
regulator and away from service provider and considering the operational maturity of 
PPPs in China, one would expect to see the legal and regulatory frameworks 
improving at the same rate or faster than other countries in the region.7 From Table 2, 
it is clear to see this is not the case. China now ranks 8th overall; 16th for legal and 
regulatory framework, and 15th for institutional framework. These rankings, combined 
with key studies by the World Bank (2015a), Deloitte (2007), Ke (2014), Liu and 
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Yamamoto (2009), and Sachs et al (2007), corroborate the inhibiting nature of 
China’s legal and regulatory framework when it comes to PPPs. This is a paradox: 
whilst the legal and regulatory frameworks remain weak, the state still maintains 
primacy in the PPP process. 
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There are certainly incentives to maintain the status quo. Without a strong regulatory 
framework, decisions can be made on a case-by-case basis to suit the personal goals 
of government officials, rather than the wider public interest. Indeed, risk factors 
identified by Sachs et al. (2007), Wang et al (2000, 1999), and Cheng and Wang 
(2009) substantiate this claim. Chang and Wang (2009) in particular show how 
personal ties and reciprocal exchanges of favours characterise many relationships 
between businesses and local government officials.  
 
As with PPP laws, there are no national PPP-specific agencies in China.8 PPP projects 
are treated in a similar way as traditional state infrastructure projects: the State 
Council and its ministries issue PPP regulations in the form of opinion, notice, and 
decision (Ke 2014). The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) act as the main players, but there is no clear 
direction on the division of responsibilities between the two (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2014). Both develop PPP guidance and set up local PPP centres, and neither 
wants to lose control over this rapidly developing sphere of influence.  
 
The lack of a definitive centralised administrative structure for PPP development 
currently acts as a constraint on operations (Zhang et al. 2015). Responsibility for 
PPP governance is fragmented across industrial sectors while administrative processes 
differ across locations within China (OECD 2005). Most PPP contracts are granted at 
the local level and local government bodies have ended up vying for power with one 
another, inhibiting effective PPP implementation (Zhang et al. 2005). In fact, the need 
to consider broader institutional arrangements to regulate PPPs between local regions 
and the centre was something highlighted by HM Treasury (2015, p. 12) in their 
recommendations to the government of China. This political dynamic isn’t 
uncommon in other areas of policy implementation across China, where there is often 
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a gap between the central government’s discourse and policies, and outcomes at local 
level (Teng and Gu, 2008; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012).   
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Herein lies another paradox. The literature on PPPs suggests this transition from 
government to governance requires loosening state control. Yet PPPs also need 
powerful central regulatory control in order to push through the relevant legal and 
regulatory frameworks. According to KPMG China, central government’s role should 
now be more about setting the regulatory framework and ‘monitoring compliance and 
performance in a transparent way that is clearly codified’, but this is simply not the 
case in many PPP projects (China Daily 2014). The weak frameworks have allowed 
the local state, to maintain primacy within the PPP operations, and it appears many 
are implemented on an ad hoc basis to suit local preferences. So, while China is often 
portrayed as the epitome of the strong central state, this particular nuance highlights a 
common feature of state-market relations in China; weak central frameworks, 
allowing for rent-seeking behaviour at the local level (Wank, 2009).  
 
China is currently seen by those in the UK government as in ‘transition’, moving not 
only from a state-driven economy to a market-driven economy, but from state 
government to PPP governance (HM Treasury 2015, p. 9). The evidence from actual 
legal and regulatory framework formalisation brings this outlook into question. 
 
Infiltration of neoliberal values 
PPPs are often associated with creeping neoliberalism and rising private sector power. 
At a slightly lower level of abstraction, PPPs are framed as inherently influenced by 
particular political values, namely, a commitment to market competition and 
privatisation. Here we assess the extent to which this holds in China by evaluating the 
commitment to the NPM agenda, specifically by gauging the level of outsourcing 
public services to private actors and the maturity of competitive tendering.  
 
Privatisation: level of outsourcing public services to private sector 
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Developed market economies have ostensibly used PPPs with the overall aim of 
achieving more effective and efficient management in public infrastructure 
provisions, in line with NPM doctrines. These doctrines favour the influence of 
private initiative in public services provision, and one would therefore expect to see 
an increase in private sector activity in relation to PPPs (Hood 1991). However, since 
the Chinese government began its promotion of the PPP model, projects that have 
proved popular have largely involved SOEs and other state-backed enterprises rather 
than truly private actors. Between 2007-2010, the majority of transport contracts, 
investment reaching $7.4 billion, were granted to SOEs (PPI Database 2015). Mu et 
al (2011) explain the shift as a result of private contractors’ projects being abandoned, 
or eventually transferred to SOEs for completion. Many PPPs in China would be 
better defined as ‘public-public partnerships.’ 
 
Large SOEs are often found in strategic sectors such as telecoms and transport; 
sectors likely to fit the PPP model. Although some firms have sold stakes to private 
investors, they operate ‘more or less like government ministries’ (The Economist 
2011). The partnerships in telecommunications, attracting $10.6 billion investment 
since 1990, are all sponsored by China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, of 
which all three are giant SOEs (PPI Database 2015). Genuine private interests do not 
support telecommunication PPPs. Nearly half of the projects in the top ten attracting 
the most investment are run by SOEs, including China Unicom, China Mobile, 
Longyuan Power Group and Daqin Railway (Ibid.) The Huaibei Power Plant, 
reaching financial closure in 1997 after a $333 million investment, was classified as a 
conventional build-operate-transfer model. It is owned by Chinese State Development 
and Investment Company (SDIC), Anhui Electricity Development Company (AEDC) 
and Huaibei Electricity Development Company (HEDC), of which all four are SOEs, 
owned by the central, provincial and local government respectively (Ibid., Smith et al. 
2004). Local governments in particular are likely to view SOEs as safer partners than 
private investors, and SOEs are better placed to bear the risk that comes with 
partnering with local government. Suggesting that PPPs follow an NPM style of 
management doesn’t seem to hold in China. The state continues to be the primary 




Part of the problem is the ambiguity in what constitutes a PPP, and this has an impact 
on the likely benefits and policy implications of pursuing a PPP-led development 
programme. Even within China, there exists a stark difference between the NDRC 
Guiding Options and the MOF notices in terms of how PPPs are defined. According 
to the NDRC Contract Guidelines (2014), an SOE can participate in a PPP 
arrangement by providing capital. However, according to the MOF notices (2014), 
only domestic and foreign private enterprises, not SOEs, may provide capital. The 
ambiguity in the term has allowed China to rework the model, defining concepts such 
as ‘public’ and ‘private’ to suit particular interests. Tracing the PPP model back to its 
roots in the UK, the Treasury (2013) defines sector classification as a matter of 
control. If a body is ‘controlled by general government (central or local) or a public 
corporation, then it will be in the public sector’, and ‘if not […] it will be in the 
private sector’ (Ibid., p. 11). There is a distinctive and important difference 
concerning PPPs in China. ‘Public’ still refers to government, but ‘private’ is equated 
instead to enterprise, including both private enterprises and state-owned. This has had 
a significant impact on the way in which PPPs operate in China. 
 
Competition: level of competitive tendering 
In recommendations to the Chinese government, HM Treasury (2015, p. 13) states the 
‘driving force behind all successful PPP programmes is competition’. The assumption 
is that for a Chinese PPP programme to be successful it may be necessary to change 
not only the way the contracts are written in terms of risk-sharing, but also how they 
are procured.  
 
For PPP tendering, the procedures need to comply with existing legislation, such as 
the Government Procurement Law (GPL) 2002, Contract Law 1999, and the 
Tendering and Bidding Law (‘Bidding Law’). The latter expresses commitment to 
creating a competitive procurement process; Article 18 stipulates ‘a bid inviter may 
not restrict or exclude any intended bidder with unreasonable requirements and may 
not apply discriminatory treatment to any intended bidder’ (NPC 2000). Loans 
provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) also require tendering processes to 
adhere to strict guidelines surrounding invitations to bid – ‘domestic preferences are 




It is difficult to determine exactly how PPPs are selected, as information related to 
shortlisting, negotiations, and appraisal is not typically available (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2012). However, we can decipher that the legal frameworks across 
China are inconsistent, leading to confusion when planning and discrepancies 
between the actual law and implementation (de Jong et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2016). It is 
worth noting that irregularities in regulatory frameworks are not uncommon in other 
parts of Asia, where the PPP model has grown rapidly in popularity (Asian 
Development Bank, 2019).9 In China, Article 43 of the Bidding Law stipulates that 
investors are not allowed to negotiate with the government on key issues such as the 
tender price (NPC 2000). However, interviews with government officials by Mu et al 
(2011, p. 799) reveal that strategic behaviour frequently emerges around 
(re)negotiation processes with bidders.  
 
Bidding occurs in a kind of black box, and this does not encourage competition. 
Although the market is technically open to the private sector, entry for non-public 
actors is severely restricted. The demands for qualifications (e.g. certificated technical 
skills and experiences) over the enterprises have increased, which works against 
private sector actors as they struggle to access these qualifications (Mu et al. 2011). 
New regulations also stipulate that contractors must pay for the full project guarantee 
deposit in advance of project commencement, which again disadvantages private 
sector actors as few can afford this payment upfront (Ibid.).  
 
Quite contrary to the popular understanding of PPPs as just another neoliberal policy 
notion, there is little evidence of NPM doctrines or rising private sector power in the 
implementation of the Chinese model. While it is inherently difficult to measure 
policy alignment with particular values, the lack of evidence linking Chinese PPPs to 
the core NPM principles of privatization and competition, using estimated levels of 
private outsourcing and competitive tendering, certainly suggests a lack of fit with the 
neoliberal values associated with PPPs in the West. 
 
 
Universal policy solution  
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At the lowest level of abstraction is the pragmatic framing of PPPs as a globally 
convergent policy tool, used by ‘nascent’ economies to access private finance and 
expertise (World Bank 2015, p. vii). To assess the extent to which China has accepted 
a universal PPP model to solve its infrastructure needs, we look at investment needs 




The World Bank estimated annual infrastructure spending in developing countries in 
2008 at $800-900 billion, of which $138 billion was private participation in 
infrastructure (Fay et al. 2011). However, the World Economic Forum (2015) 
calculated a global infrastructure financing gap of approximately $1 trillion per 
annum, and infrastructure investment needs are unsurprisingly higher in emerging 
markets than in developed markets. Similarly, Bhattacharyay (2012) in his work for 
ADB found that 32 economies in Asia would need $8.2 trillion (2008 prices) over the 
course of 2011-2020; China would require more than half of the estimated amount. In 
other words, China has become the world’s largest infrastructure market and leads all 
major economies in infrastructure investment as a proportion of GDP (McKinsey 
2014). 
 
- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
 
In China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015), the annual GDP growth rate was 
expected to reach seven per cent and an urbanisation rate of 51.5 per cent. In response 
to the rising urbanisation, the government has continuously promoted the 
development of public transportation and other public facilities such as water supply, 
gas supply, and waste disposal (Ibid.). Key targets set in the FYP cannot be achieved 
if the government relies on public financing alone, particularly considering that the 
central and subnational governments are suffering from debts of RMB 123,814.04 
trillion and 178,908.66 trillion respectively (Ke 2014). However, Figure 4 shows that 
public finance still dominates in emerging Asia, especially in China.  
 




Therefore, there have been significant efforts to shift the balance (Inderst 2016). The 
mobilisation of public funds and accumulating foreign debt has enhanced the interests 
of nascent economies in the provision of infrastructure projects through PPP schemes. 
Yangmin Yang, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Finance, recognises this, 
having stated that the promotion of PPPs is ‘consistent with our national development 
needs’ (Asian Development Bank 2014, p. 3). Thus, it seems the increasing number of 
PPP projects on the market is unavoidable; the government has to rely on private 
finance to initiate the infrastructure projects (Sachs et al. 2007). This supports the 
argument that PPPs are needed in China in order to finance increasing demands for 
investment in infrastructure.  
 
 
Resource and knowledge sharing 
When it comes to sharing resources and knowledge, the debt burdens of local 
municipalities in China means private investors act less as ‘partners’ and more as 
mere funding sources. This idea is supported by Wang Baoan, Vice-Minister of 
Finance, who has noticed a certain ‘blindness in selecting projects’ and a hastiness to 
use the PPP model purely as a means to access finance (CDM Fund 2014). Whilst 
investment needs are dire, the promotion of PPPs as sharing mutual benefits and 
knowledge transfer has not quite entered the mind-set of the Chinese central 
government or the local authorities (Asian Development Bank 2014; International 
Institute for Sustainable Development 2015).  
 
The main advantages of the PPP model for government officials seem to be purely 
centred on accessing finance. PPPs were listed by the State Council as one of the two 
major ways to manage local government debt (Zhang 2014). The Council listed 80 
projects that would include private investment, again emphasizing the role of private 
capital as local governments’ budget funds run low (Ibid.). In a study by Chan et al. 
(2009), the top driver for PPPs identified by Chinese respondents was public sector 
budget restraints. This has worked to the detriment of certain PPP projects. Real estate 
investor Ren Zhiqiang heavily criticised the PPP model; according to him, his 
investment in Line 4 of the Beijing subway turned out to be more of a ‘generous 
20 
 
donation’ (Zhang 2014). Such complaints reflect a wider pattern of how PPPs are 
implemented in China. The government maintains the dominant role while private 
investors are regarded as ‘cash cows’ or ‘automatic teller machines’ (Ibid.). 
 
This can be traced back to government fiscal policy. 90 per cent of PPP contracts 
were granted at the local level where there is a lack of capacity to impose taxes (see 
Figure 2). This increases incentives to make extensive use of off-budget financing 
options for infrastructure (Ke and Wang 2015). In most PPP projects, private partners 
have sole responsibility for the financing component. Research suggests that the PPP 
model is a new label given to the government’s previous practice of simply 
encouraging private capital to enter certain areas (Yun et al. 2015). So the lack of 
finance available at the local level suggests that what drives the opening up of the 
infrastructure market to the private sector is the pressure of inadequate fiscal 
resources. 
 
However, while PPPs have been promoted as a way to assist local governments to cut 
debt, it appears that it is contributing to increasing local government debt in the long 
term, particularly in poorer areas such as Guizhou and Yunnan (Sheehan, 2017). 
These areas are building a pipeline of PPP projects, but racking up contractual 
obligations to, for example, fill the cash-flow gap for user-pay projects. This has put 
burdens on local level finances, which S&P Global estimated at $6 trillion in 2018 
(S&P Global Insights, 2018). China’s vice minister of finance, Shi Yaobin, has 
recognised PPPs role in this as a problem, explicitly saying they may ‘increase local 
governments’ debt risk’ (Reuters, 2016). Similarly, a senior official from the MOF 
criticised the misuse of PPPs by local authorities, saying some ‘chalk up debt for 
unsuitable schemes’ (ibid.).  
 
The temptation to simply use private sector money to fund infrastructure projects 
means subnational governments do not carefully consider the full range of 
requirements and benefits associated with the PPP model (Ke 2014). Through the 
pragmatic lens, PPPs should present a number of recognised advantages; whilst these 
include additional finance, they should also bring the private sector operational 
efficiencies and value for money  (VfM) (European Commission 2003). Herein lies 
the discrepancy between the PPP model promoted by IOs and that by the Chinese 
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government (Winch et al. 2012). The increased use of PPPs in China stems from the 
desire for additionality to the public funding capability.10 VfM and sharing mutual 
benefits do not seem to factor into these arrangements in China, particularly given 
that no VfM assessment has been developed (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012; 
Sachs et al. 2007).   
 
Discussion  
Through the conceptual lenses, we have seen that the anticipated shift toward 
regulatory governance does not bear out China. Closer analysis reveals how the lack 
of formal PPP institutions and PPP laws enable projects to be implemented differently 
in China according to local circumstances, predominantly to the advantages of 
government officials.  
 
Applying the ideological lens exposes a distortion in the definition of PPPs in China. 
Rather than increasing private sector power from the same starting point as a liberal 
market economy, PPPs have been employed strategically as a language game in order 
to manipulate the conventional definition. The MOF and NDRC define PPPs 
differently – one includes SOEs and the other does not – and no attempt has been 
made to clear up this definition. Keeping the definition vague allows the state to 
control the vast majority of partnerships via the involvement of SOEs. The lack of 
competition in PPPs also points to a deliberate manipulation; private investors are 
frequently denied entry to the infrastructure market. This provides an important check 
on the claim that PPPs are evidence of transition to a liberal market economy. Instead, 
our analysis reveals the fluid nature of the term and how it can be aligned to meet the 
expectations of the politico-economic context. 
 
Applying the pragmatic lens shows us that the dire investment needs and lack of 
money at the local level in China have worked to skew the PPP model, where private 
investors are used as mere cash cows rather than entering into genuine partnerships. 
No VfM assessment has been developed, giving an impression that whilst the PPP 
model claims to bring several advantages, in China it serves one purpose – increasing 
public funding capabilities. Our analysis shows that the idea of PPPs as a partnership 
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based on mutual exchange does not apply in China. Instead, our findings suggest that 
the main driving force behind PPPs in China is fiscal restraints. 
 
Whether observed through a conceptual, ideological or pragmatic lens, Chinese PPPs 
are resulting in increased state control. This is either through a lack of legal basis and 
regulatory framework meaning state officials can manipulate the PPP process, 
through a lack of definition allowing SOEs to enter partnerships, or through the state 
using private actors as merely a source of funding.  
 
Our findings suggest that China is not experiencing a transition to a neoliberal 
reconstituted state relying on private sector funding and expertise. In China, PPPs are 
used by the state solely to access funds rather than share expertise. SOEs are 
strengthened in the process, and there has been little commitment to formalising the 
PPP-enabling environment as encouraged by the World Bank and other global 
institutions. There is little evidence to suggest China intends to take the same route 
that other liberal market economies have. Theoretically, this poses a challenge to the 
existing debates in political economy scholarship, calling into question prevailing 
understandings of PPPs and what their proliferation means for China and beyond.  
 
Conclusion 
HM Treasury (2015, p. 10) regard PPPs in China as ‘transitional structures on the 
journey towards more market-based relationships’. Other reports similarly make it 
clear that China is simply low on the PPP ‘maturity curve’ (Deloitte 2007; Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2014), still working on its commitment to the PPP model. China is 
represented as a laggard, behind in establishing a viable legal and institutional 
framework that encourages competitive tendering and makes use of private sector 
expertise. A work in progress, if you will. 
 
Based on prevailing understandings of the meaning and function of PPPs, one could 
be forgiven for concluding that the rise of PPPs in China represents a break from 
earlier state-centric modes of governance and further evidence of a liberalising 
Chinese economy. But, on the contrary, our findings suggest that the state remains the 
dominant partner in Chinese PPPs. In fact, our analysis suggests that the state actually 
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uses PPPs as a mechanism for strengthening its own hand. So instead of supporting 
claims of a liberalising Chinese economy, our findings seem to support the idea that 
China is falling back to an older principle, moving away from privatisation, which it 
followed briefly in the 1980s, back towards the state taking full control, preferring 
investment from SOEs and a lack of competitive tendering.11  
 
Through our analysis, we have revealed the significant ways in which the Chinese 
PPP model differs from the Western model in practice. Yet, evaluations of Chinese 
PPPs continue to be extrapolated from the Western experience. This, we argue, has 
contributed to a fundamental misunderstanding about what the dramatic rise in the 
number of PPPs in China signifies in terms of the direction of state-market relations 
in the country. And this misunderstanding, in turn, should serve as a reminder of the 
political and protean nature of such concepts and their intimate relationship to the 
context in which they have developed. 
 
It is, however, important to note three caveats here. First, our study focuses on PPPs 
in infrastructure. This constitutes a strategic realm of the economy. There is evidence 
that China is indeed engaging in market liberalisation outside such ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy (Breslin 2012; Pearson 2005). As such, our findings should 
be taken as limited to these large projects with any further generalizations subject to 
future study. Second, there is an on-going and lively debate over just how 
autonomous Chinese SOEs are from the party-state (Gonzalez-Vicente 2012; Jones 
and Zou 2017). While there is no consensus on the exact nature of SOEs in China, a 
daunting task given the level of variation among them, there is general agreement that 
the vast majority of SOEs remain at least under indirect control of the central 
government (Breslin 2012; Jones and Zou 2017; Zhang 2010), something that is 
echoed in our study here. Third, private sector actors, states, and international 
organisations have increasingly been advocating for the use of PPPs in the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) (Ma 2019; Sugden 2017). While there has yet to be significant 
use of the model in the context of the BRI, it would presumably involve relationships 
with host country governments and the private sector that would differ from the 
Chinese infrastructure projects discussed here. This does seem to be pitched as a way 
to access finance, and will be something to watch closely as a potentially important 




Beyond PPPs, the findings show how the rise of China has opened up conceptual 
space for a fuller understanding of the political and historical nature of policy 
instruments and our interpretations of them. On the one hand, with a history of state 
control and a centrally planned economy, China is using the PPP model much 
differently than the liberal market democracies in which it originated. This variation 
appears to reflect differences in the relative power underpinning state-market relations 
in each context, as well as differences in the ideologically driven understandings of 
how these relations should play out. It also indicates, yet again, that China is one to 
watch; consistently defying expectations and challenging existing scholarship on the 
relationship between economic liberalisation and democracy, and capitalism and 
authoritarianism. The outcomes of these partnerships in the Chinese context not only 
underscore just how powerful the state remains in China, but also remind us of the 
power of the private sector relative to the state in Western, liberal democracies. On 
the other hand, China is using the ambiguity surrounding the PPP model to serve 
particular interests, much like it has been used in Western economies for some time. 
This should serve as a reminder of the ways in which power shapes the character of 
such policy tools and the meanings we derive from them. Whether the Chinese PPP 
model will serve as an alternative model for other economies moving forward, or 
whether it is a temporary reckoning, will only be determined in time. 
 
So the findings not only demonstrate the importance of the political-economic 
environment in determining the character of policy instruments and outcomes, but 
they also show just how steeped in context prevailing understandings of such policy 
instruments and their conceptual underpinnings have been. This should serve as a 
check not only on claims of a rapidly liberalising China, but also a check on the 
tendency to universalise inherently political policy instruments that were born at a 
particular time, in a particular place, and for a particular purpose. 
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Fig. 1: Recommendations for a PPP-enabling environment. (Source: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2014; European Commission, 2004; OECD, 2015; PPIAF, 2009; 
UNCITRAL, 2001; UNECE, 2004; UNESCAP, 2014b; World Bank, 2015; World 
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Fig. 2 Government granting contract. 











Fig. 4: Sources of infrastructure finance in emerging markets and developing 
economies (EMDEs). (Source: Bhattacharyay, 2012; Inderst, 2016) 
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Table 1: A framework of expectations with indicators 
 
 
Indicator 2011 ranking 2014 ranking Rank change 
Legal and regulatory 
framework 
11 16 -5 
Institutional framework 13 15 -2 
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Overall 8 7 -1 




                                                        
1 While scholarship on political economy is obviously broad, historiographies show 
that the modern field of political economy and its sub-disciplines, for example IPE, 
are built on Eurocentric foundations (Hobson 2013; Cohen 2007). 
2 See, for example, Deloitte (2007); Economist Intelligence Unit (2014); HM 
Treasury (2015). 
3 A BOT Project is typically greenfield in nature, where the project company or 
operator obtains its revenues through a fee charged to the utility or government rather 
than tariffs charged to consumers (PPIAF 2014a) 
4 Other elements included in the EIU Infrascope Index (2014, 2012) are operational 
maturity, investment climate, financial facilities and sub-national adjustment factor.  
5 Translation from HM Treasury (2015). 
6 This is behind Australia, UK, Korea, Gujarat State, India and Japan. Two countries 
out of the sixteen were used as benchmarks of best practice cases, but are not located 
in the Asia-Pacific region (UK and Australia).  
7 China ranks highly for operational maturity in the EIU index, as it commissioned 
529 PPPs, the second highest over the study period. 
8 This is in contrast to other countries - for example both India and Australia have 
Public-Private Partnership Units. The latter has a PPP agency in each state.  
9 For example, in Indonesia, there are discrepancies in PPP procurement procedures, 
where one regulation stipulates a minimum of five bidders, and another three (Asian 
Development Bank, 2019). 
10 Additionality in this context is the ‘provision of private capital, additional to that 
available from public sources, for investment in public infrastructure’ (Winch et al. 
2012, p. 12) 
11 Mu et al. (2011) trace the movement from the centrally planned economy to 
privatization and eventually through to the PPP model. 
